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MASs COMMUNICATIONS LAw: CAsEs AND COMMENT. By Donald 
M. Gillmor and Jerome A. Barron. West. 1969. Pp. xxvi, 853. $12.50. 
I read the news today ... oh boy.• 
Read the news today, and it will quickly become apparent why 
Gillmor and Barron's excellent and valuable case book is so timely. 
Jtem: On November 14, 1969, Vice President Spiro Agnew 
criticized the television networks for their "instant analysis and 
querulous criticism" of President Nixon's November 3, 1969, Viet-
nam speech.1 Although the network heads responded with eloquent 
statements of determination to resist governmental commands, they 
did not give one minute of live or special network coverage to the 
largest demonstration in American history-the antiwar demon-
stration on November 15, 1969, in Washington, D.C. Moreover, 
when the President again spoke on Vietnam, on December 8, 1969, 
the networks were silent; and ABC and CBS made no immediate 
comment following President Nixon's December 15, 1969, announce-
ment of troop withdrawals from Vietnam. TV Guide observed that 
the Vice President's "scolding of the networks apparently had the 
desired result ... .''2 
Item: The public has recently learned that for years United 
States district attorneys have been issuing subpoenas to numerous 
national newspapers, magazines, television networks and stations, 
and news reporters, ordering them to turn over their notes, corres-
pondence, telephone-call memoranda, and unedited tapes and film 
("outtakes") for apparent use in criminal prosecutions against per-
sons who criticized the Government.3 The minute this surprising 
news broke, confidential news sources began to dry up. Walter 
Cronkite reported that during the first week there were two instances 
in which officials refused to "talk off the record" for fear that their 
remarks would be used in court.4 Television officials advocated de-
stroying or erasing film or video tape within twelve hours after 
broadcast, and Broadcasting magazine reported that one unidentified 
station "already is destroying unused tape recordings."5 
• The Beatles, "A Day in the Life," Sgt. Pepper's Lonely Hearts Club Band 
(Capitol). 
I. N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1969, at I, col. 2. 
2. TV GumE, Jan. 3, 1970, at I. Indeed, the Vice President himself recently reflected: 
"Sometimes when I look around [at] the tube from time to time, I think I have had a 
modicum of success .••• " J. Osborn, Agnew's Effect, THE NEW REPUBUc, Feb. 28, 1970, 
at 13-14. 
3. See notes 16-18 infra and accompanying text. 
4. BROADCASTING, Feb. 9, 1970, at 58. 
5. BROADCASTING, Feb. 9, 1970, at 60. 
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Item: On December I, 1969, Senator Pastore's Communications 
Subcommittee of the Senate Commerce Committee spent several 
hours berating the commissioners of the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) for failing to prosecute certain radio broadcasters 
for the alleged "obscenity," "filth," "smut," and "gutter language" 
contained in certain records, poems, and plays that were broadcast by 
their radio stations.6 FCC Chairman Dean Burch reasssured Senator 
Pastore that the Commission would move quickly to punish broad-
casters for speech prohibited by the broad statutory rubric of 
"obscene, indecent, or profane language,"7 and he reported that he 
had already obtained the willingness of Deputy Attorney General 
Kleindienst to initiate criminal prosecutions in such cases.8 Shortly 
thereafter, the FCC majority, with Commissioners Cox and Johnson 
dissenting, reversed its long-established policy against penalizing 
broadcasters for "a few isolated programs," and placed a Seattle 
station on a probationary one-year license renewal for accidentally 
broadcasting a few four-letter words which, although not ruled 
"obscene, indecent, or profane language" by the FCC, allegedly vio-
lated the station's own standards of propriety.9 
Item: Early in 1969, at the urging of various lobbies from the 
broadcasting industry, Senator Pastore proposed legislation that 
would prevent citizens' groups from filing competing applications for 
the licenses of existing stations which the challengers felt were not 
serving the public interest.10 If enacted into law, this bill might easily 
convert a broadcaster's presently "temporary" three-year license, 
which is subject to renewal by the FCC, into a monopoly grant in 
perpetuity. Although certain citizens' groups expressed strong dis-
approval of the bill,11 over one hundred senators and congressmen 
quickly moved to support it. What congressman, after all, can resist 
with impunity the demands of his home-state media when he is able 
to communicate with his electorate only at that media's pleasure? 
Item: On January 15, 1969, the FCC accomplished much of 
6. Hearings on S. 2001, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 343 (1969). 
7. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1964) provides: "Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or pro-
fane language by means of radio communication shall be fined not more than $10,000 
or imprisoned not more than two years, or both." 
8. Hearings on S. 2001, 91st Cong., 1st Sess, at 343, 367 (1969). 
9. Jackstraw Memorial Foundation, 21 F.C.C.2d 833, 18 P &: F RADIO REG. 2d 414 
(1970). See also Eastern Educ. Radio (WUHY-FM), 18 P &: F RADIO REG. 2d 860 (1970) 
(FCC 70-346, released April 3, 1970, notice of apparent liability). 
10. S. 2004, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). 
11. For example, Black Efforts for Soul in Television (B.E.S.T.) charged that S. 2004 
was "back door racism" and would exclude minorities from access to media ownership 
in most large communities; the National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting 
(N.C.C.B.) argued that the Senate Bill would perpetuate excessive concentrations of 
media control; and the American Civil Liberties Union (A.C.L.U.) warned that S. 2004 
would remove "competition" from the system of broadcast regulation and would 
"freeze out every underrepresented class in Atnerican Society." 
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Senator Pastore's work for him by adopting, over Commissioner 
Johnson's dissent, a "Policy Statement on Comparative Hearings In-
volving Regular Renewal Applicants."12 The policy statement an-
nounced that the FCC would refuse even to consider applications 
by citizens' groups for existing stations if the incumbent licensee 
could show that his programming was "substantially attuned to 
meeting the needs and interests of its area,"13 no matter how superior 
the challenger's programming proposals were, or how monopolistic 
the incumbent licensee might be. 
Item: In 1968, two citizens of Salt Lake City filed complaints with 
the FCC arguing that the license of KSL-AM, owned by the Mormon 
Church, should not be renewed. The complainants based their 
challenge to renewal partially on the grounds of monopoly-referring 
to the Mormon Church's control over KSL-FM, KSL-TV, Brigham 
Young University's FM-TV complex, and one of Salt Lake City's two 
daily newspapers. The Commission twice rejected these complaints, 
on the theory that media ownership patterns should not be changed 
by ad hoc citizens' petitions.14 Unfortunately, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed,111 
holding that the FCC was not compelled by its statutory mandate to 
resolve questions of excessive media concentration on individual 
cases as they arose, but could, in its discretion, settle them in general 
rule-making proceedings. Until the FCC reverses its position, there-
fore, citizens may have lost their right to challenge license renewals 
on grounds of "undue concentration of control." 
Item: For many years, the FCC has required broadcasters to 
survey the needs and interests of their communities periodically by 
consulting with community leaders and other individuals and then 
broadcasting programs that respond to these needs and interests. This 
requirement is, perhaps, the only effective "handle" by which the 
FCC can ensure that broadcasters provide some community-service 
programming. On March 2, 1970, however, Broadcasting magazine 
reported that the FCC staff is preparing a memorandum suggesting 
that the community ascertainment procedure be "scrapped."16 
In sum, during the past year or so, the Administration has 
moved against the news media by means of the Vice President's 
speeches and the Attorney General's subpoenas; and Congress has 
12. Comparative Hearing on Renewal Applicants, 22 F.C.C.2d 424, 18 P &: F RADIO 
REG. 2d 1901 (1970). 
13. 22 F.C.C.2d at 425, 18 P &: F RADIO REG. 2d at 1904. 
14. KSL, Inc., FCC 68-1005 (Oct. 4, 1968), petition for reconsideration denied, 16 
F.C.C.2d 340, 15 P &: F RAD10 REG. 2d 458 (1969). 
15. Hale v. FCC, Case No. 22,751 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 1970). 
16. BROADCASTING, March 2, 1970, at 5. 
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begun to consider Senator Pastore's license monopoly bill.17 In addi-
tion, during 1969, the FCC has begun moving against broadcasters 
for their nonconventional modes of expression; it has threatened to 
undermine the community ascertainment programming surveys; and 
it has seriously curtailed the ability of citizens' groups both to file 
competing applications for broadcast licenses and to challenge media 
"monopolies" at license renewal time. 
At this juncture, Professors Gillmor and Barron have introduced 
their book of cases and materials on the "law of mass communica-
tions." No brief review of a book such as this can adequately 
summarize its contents or achievements. Suffice it to say that the 
authors' work is comprehensive, well organized, perceptively an-
notated, and a generally valuable contribution to students and 
teachers of law and journalism. 
Yet the ultimate value of this casebook may lie beyond its 
excellence as measured in such traditional law school terms as 
depth, thoroughness, and breadth. Gillmor and Barron's book, in 
the words of its authors, is "the outcome of an interdisciplinary 
collaboration between a professor of journalism [Gillmor] and a 
professor of law [Barron]" (p. xi). The principal value of this 
collaboration may stem from the fact that it provides students with 
the perception and skills to resist some of the aforementioned re-
cent and serious incursions on the freedoms of mass communications. 
One example will suffice: the recent wave of subpoenas issued 
by the Justice Department. From sketchy newspaper accounts, the 
public has recently learned that the Justice Department has for 
years and as a matter of standard procedure obtained from news 
reporters-by formal subpoenas or informal cooperation-notes, 
memoranda, and film to be used either as evidence in criminal 
prosecutions or as "back.ground files" on allegedly "subversive" 
persons. The following examples illustrate the type of demands 
that have been put on the media: 
During the lengthy trials following the demonstrations at the 
Democratic Convention in Chicago, the local news media-espe-
cially broadcasting stations-received repeated subpoenas for news 
film. Reporters said the practice was "an almost daily burden of 
nearly unmanageable proportions. 'We are treated as evidence gath-
erers for the law.' "18 
In connection with the Government's prosecution of David 
Hilliard, a Black Panther leader from the West Coast, for allegedly 
17. Congress has also been considering the "Failing Newspaper Act," S. 1520, 91st 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), H.R. 279, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), which would permit news-
paper cooperation otherwise barred by the antitrust laws. The bill, as amended on the 
floor, passed the Senate and is currently in the House Judiciary Committee, and is 
apparently destined for passage. 
18. BROADCASTING, Feb. 9, 1970, at 58. 
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threatening the President, the Justice Department issued a subpoena 
on January 8, 1970, for all CBS video tape (including "outtakes," 
the unused portions of the interview) made in connection with the 
60 Minutes program on the Black Panthers, which was broadcast on 
January 6, 1970. According to indications from Richard Salant, CBS 
News President, CBS's initial response was to supply the requested 
material.19 
On October 2, 1969, the Justice Department subpoenaed all the 
notes of a reporter from Fortune magazine, John McDonald, on an 
interview with James Ling, head of Ling-Temco-Vought, in connec-
tion with an antitrust proceeding. It also subpoenaed McDonald's 
tape recordings, documents furnished by Ling, and "the successive 
drafts" of McDonald's article before it was published. While Fortune 
was considering the request, officials from the Justice Department 
visited the headquarters of Time, Inc., which publishes Fortune, and 
appropriated the written material. Four months later the Depart-
ment publicly apologized.20 
19. BROADCASTING, Feb. 2, 1970, at 55. Apparently unsatisfied with even this broad 
subpoena, the Justice Department-this time in connection with the Secret Service and 
the FBI-issued a second subpoena against CBS on January 26, 1970, demanding 
records of all correspondence, memoranda, notes, and telephone calls made in connec-
tion with the 60 Minutes Black Panthers program, including material relating to the 
CBS interview in Algeria with Eldridge Cleaver, the Panthers' minister of information. 
This second subpoena covered materials from mid-1968 to 1970. An unidentified legal 
spokesman from CBS stated that the network might go to court if a "really solid" 
freedom of the press question were raised, but he indicated that he wanted to reach 
an accommodation with the federal authorities. 
Richard Salant indicated at that time that CBS might supply the Government with 
information in limited cases, even though it "might hurt journalistic functions." 
BROADCASTING, Feb. 2, 1970, at 55. In February, however, CBS said that it might chal-
lenge subpoenas in "appropriate" cases, and Salant expressed his personal opposition 
to the subpoena procedure. Washington Post, Feb. 4, 1970, at A-8, col. 6. 
20. N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1970, at 24, col. 4. In recent months, several other 
cases of official pressure on the media have been made public. For example, following 
the "Weathermen" incident in Chicago, in October 1969, the United States Attorney 
demanded that Chicago's four daily newspapers, its TV stations, and Time, Life, and 
Newsweek magazines tum over films, photos, and files on the incident. Time and Life 
apparently complied; Newsweek made some effort to protect confidential informants; 
and the newspapers apparently decided to tum over that information which the Gov-
ernment could not get elsewhere. Washington Post, Feb. 4, 1970, at A-8, col. 6. Simi-
larly, after the Chicago police raid on the Black Panthers in December 1969, "blanket 
subpoenas" were again issued to the Chicago media, according to James Hoge, editor 
of the Chicago Sun-Times. Apparently the Chicago media did not vigorously or pub-
licly resist. Washington Post, Feb. 4, 1970, at A-8, col. 6. The Justice Department also 
recently subpoenaed all the notes and tape recordings of New York Times reporter Earl 
Caldwell, made with Black Panthers during interviews dating back to the beginning 
of 1969. Washington Post, Feb. 4, 1970, at A-8, col. 6. At last report, however, the 
Justice Department had "postponed indefinitely" its subpoena of Caldwell, Washington 
Post, Feb. 11, 1970, at A-14, col. 6, and a federal court has ruled that Caldwell may 
refuse to disclose the identities of his confidential informants until the government 
makes a "clear showing of compelling and overriding national interest that cannot be 
served by alternative means.'' In re Caldwell, 38 U.S.L.W. 2540 (N.D. Cal., April 14, 
1970). The executive editor of the Washington Post reported that twice in the past 
two years the Post has been asked to supply photographs for use in criminal actions. 
The Post has refused both requests. Washington Post, Feb. 4, 1970, at A-4, col. 1. 
Again, in 1968, following the April 1967 civil disorders in Washington, D.C., the 
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Why did the media tolerate these serious incursions on their 
journalistic freedoms for so long without even raising a public 
outcry or protest? The answer, I think, lay in a "communications 
gap" between journalists and lawyers. The journalists were unaware 
of the legal methods available to resist the demands of the Justice 
Department. And the lawyers, too often working as hired guns for 
the corporate board rooms of large media conglomerates, either 
failed to understand the serious chilling effect of these subpoenas 
on journalistic freedom or simply placed the profit-and-loss state-
ments of their corporate overlords above traditional first amendment 
values. 
Alan Adelson has reviewed the subpoenas controversy for Satur-
day Review in an article entitled, "Have the News Media Become 
Too Big To Fight?"21 For four months, Adelson reported, the most 
prominent news institutions turned over films and reporters' ac-
counts of interviews and disturbances to law enforcement authorities. 
Why had these institutions "neglected to defend fully the right to 
privacy with their sources"?22 Adelson's conclusion is one that 
serious students of the media should ponder long and seriously: 
According to several accounts, the [media's corporate] lawyers 
saw not only no alternative to complying with the subpoenas but 
little reason not to. As Barton Clausen of the American Civil Liber-
ties Union puts it: "Corporate attorneys don't even know about press 
freedom." While that judgment may be a bit harsh, the accepted 
practice for media attorneys is to worry about protecting first profits 
and the stockholder interests, and then the freedoms and the pre-
rogatives of the joumalists.23 
According to Adelson, network officials at CBS admitted that "an 
internecine conflict broke out between the news department and 
the corporate lawyers over whether the network should deliver 
its films and notes on the Black Panthers."24 According to another 
account, attorneys for Time, Newsweek, and CBS "not only advised 
against any hope of winning a court battle but suggested that every-
Justice Department subpoenaed newsfilm and news photographs of TV stations and 
newspapers. After conferences between the Department and the stations, some of the 
film was viewed at the stations. BROADCASTING, Feb. 9, 1970, at 60. In addition, film 
shot by cameramen from a Baltimore television station of the 1969 raid by the "D.C. 
Nine" on the offices of Dow Chemical in Washington was subpoenaed and introduced 
as evidence at trial. BROADCASTING, Feb. 9, 1970, at 60. Finally, at the trial of the 
"Catonsville Nine,•• a group accused of burning draft files in Baltimore, air film as well 
as "outtakes" were subpoenaed and used at the trial. BROADCASTING, Feb. 9, 1970, at 60. 
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one keep the whole question quiet."25 It was not until Jack Gould 
broke the story in the New York Times a week later that the public 
learned of the industry-government deal.26 
Why, then, did highly trained lawyers react in ways so antagonis-
tic to first amendment freedoms? Again, the answer may be that 
journalists and lawyers do not communicate their values and con-
cerns to each other. Law schools have generally not devoted much 
attention to the law of "mass communications." Most students are 
acquainted with this body of law only tangentially, through courses 
in constitutional, copyright, or administrative law. Apart from a few 
isolated cases concerning movie censorship,27 even constitutional law 
courses deal primarily with books, magazines, newspapers, soap box 
orators, and the occasional pamphleteer. Rarely do students come in 
contact with the special problems of radio, television, cable televi-
sion, telephone and common carrier regulation, communications 
satellites, and the like. Moreover, to the extent that law courses 
in "Communications" do exist, they are too often confined to the 
technical aspects of administrative regulation, such as license re-
newal applications, transmitter changes, broadcast signal overlaps, 
and fairness doctrine complaints. 
Conversely, journalism schools have generally offered courses 
designed to give their students only a brief acquaintance with some 
of the legal pitfalls they may encounter in their profession-libel 
and slander, deceptive advertising, copyright problems, and some 
first amendment violations. Rarely are journalism students familiar-
ized with such "legal" problems as rights of "access" by individual 
citizens or groups to the facilities owned and controlled by the 
mass media, rights of privacy, or the application of antitrust laws 
to the press; and they are almost never given a thorough grounding 
in the principles and values of freedom of speech or in the many 
facets of broadcast regulation-diversification of ownership, the 
fairness doctrine, ascertainment of community needs and interests, 
and so on. 
Gillmor and Barron's book bridges this interdisciplinary gap 
with substantial success. Of the six major chapters, Professor Barron 
has been the principal author for I, V, and VI: "The First Amend-
ment Impact on Mass Communication," "Selected Problems of Law 
and Journalism," and "The Regulation of Radio and Television 
Broadcasting." Professor Gillmor has taken primary responsibility 
for chapters II, III, and IV: "Libel and the Newsman," "The 
Puzzle of Pornography," and "Free Press and Fair Trial." 
25. Id. at 107. 
26. N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1970, at 71, cols. 1-4. 
27. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 
U.S. 147 (1939); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
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Chapter I takes the student through the perplexing but ringing 
debates over the "clear and present danger" test. As the reader makes 
his way along the historic route of Schenk,28 Abrams,29 Gitlow,3o 
De]onge,31 Douds,32 Dennis,33 and Yates,34 he encounters some of 
the most brilliant constitutional doctrine ever penned by the Justices 
of the Supreme Court. He sees Justice Holmes, for instance, cau-
tion against "falsely shouting fire in a crowded theatre,"35 create 
the "clear and present danger" test,36 and remind us that "the best 
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in 
the competition of the market .... "37 He sees Justice Sanford warn 
that speech alone may threaten revolution and that a "single revolu-
tionary spark [ of speech] may kindle a fire that, smouldering for a 
time, may burst into a sweeping and destructive conflagration,''38 
and he sees Justice Brandeis, two years later, counter with the 
famous words: "Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppres-
sion of speech and assembly .... If there be time to expose through 
discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes 
of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced 
silence."39 Throughout their discussion of the evolution of first 
amendment doctrine, Gillmor and Barron carefully encourage the 
student to draw contemporary implications from older precedent. 
For example, drawing on Justice Holmes' "market place of ideas" 
concept, the authors suggest that "[t]he 'market' Holmes is talking 
about is basically what we call today the mass media ... " (p. 16). 
They then ask whether " 'free trade in ideas' [is] the distinguishing 
characteristic of these media" (p. 16). This stress on the free flow 
of ideas ties together the latter portions of the first chapter, which 
are devoted to recent cases and ·writings on the theory-proposed 
by Professor Barron-that truly free speech requires "access" to the 
microphones, the television lenses, and the printing presses of the 
mass media. Free speech, the authors suggest, cannot be free in a 
closet. Rather, true communication requires both a speaker and an 
audience, and that audience today is the audience of millions who sit 
before their radio or television sets and read their daily newspapers. 
28. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
29. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
30. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
31. DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937). 
32. American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950). 
33. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1950). 
34. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957). 
35. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
36. 249 U.S. at 52. 
37, Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) Oustice Holmes, dissenting). 
38. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 669 (1925). 
39. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376-77 (1927) (concurring opinion). 
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Chapter II systematically organizes and explores the law of libel, 
but from the newsman's perspective as well as the lawyer's. Thus, 
in addition to the more or less standard treatment of New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan40 and its progeny, the authors delve into ques-
tions of damages, criminal libel, malice, burdens of proof, and-in 
virtual hornbook fashion-the defenses against libel. The authors 
also discuss the newsman's privilege to refuse to disclose his confiden-
tial sources of information-a subject which the recent subpoena con-
troversy has dramatically brought to the public's attention. Chapter 
II also contains a clear exposition of the "secondary" defenses to 
libel-retraction and apology, reply, settlement, proof of previous 
bad reputation, and reliance on a usually reliable source-and of 
other facets of this difficult area which are particularly important 
to newsmen. 
Chapter III analyzes the law of "obscenity" and provides substan-
tial historical, sociological, and anecdotal material on the problem.41 
Law students in this area are too often trapped in a moral and 
sociological wilderness with only the compass of well-worn legal 
phrases to guide them. The authors seek to remedy this deficiency 
by drawing upon materials from literature, psychology, sociology, 
and the experiences of other countries. Although such terms as 
"hard core," "patently offensive," "well beyond the bounds of 
contemporary community standards," "socially redeeming interest," 
"pandering," "prurient interests," and "obscenity per quod" soon 
begin to swim before the student's eyes-despite Justice Stewart's 
contention that at least he knows it when he sees it42-the authors 
have made the best of a difficult job. 
One deficiency in chapter III, for my purposes at least, is the 
absence of any discussion of standards for the control of "obscenity" 
or "indecent" language over the broadcast media. To put the prob-
lem bluntly, if I Am Curious (Yellow) is cleared by the Supreme 
Court for distribution in movie houses around the United States, 
how should the FCC react to a network proposal to show it on 
the "Nine O'Clock Movie" to a potential audience of sixty million? 
Everyone is accustomed to reading four-letter words occasionally, 
even in some of the nation's leading magazines. Reading, however, 
is essentially a private activity, engaged in solely by the person in 
whose hands the book or magazine is placed; hence those offended 
by some of the oldest Anglo-Saxon words in the English language 
have the simple expedient of not reading them. But what of radio 
40. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
41. The authors note, for example, that "[t]he Illinois Vigilance Association dis• 
covered in 1922 that jazz had 'caused the downfall' of one thousand girls in Chicago 
alone .••• So laws were passed to prohibit the playing of jazz in public places •••• " 
(p. 287). 
42. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) Q'ustice Stewart, concurring). 
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and television? Is television anything more than an electronic, pub-
lic billboard? And how would the law react to public billboards 
(electronic or otherwise) depicting scenes of intercourse or stating 
familiar "four-letter words"? Traditional constitutional law analyses 
have defined the concept of "obscenity" as material designed to 
arouse prurient interests in sexual matters.43 Yet what form of 
constitutional protection should be given to "four-letter words"-
especially when broadcast over radio and television? Individual 
four-letter words may arouse a number of emotions in the average 
listener but I rather doubt that a "prurient interest in sex" is one 
of them. ·where, then, in that hierarchy of constitutionally pro-
tected forms of expression, are we to find the often-used, but 
much-maligned, "four-letter word"? Gillmor and Barron's casebook 
offers us little guidance in answering this question.44 
Chapter IV, "Free Press and Free Trial," in addition to discus-
sing Irvin v. Doud,45 the Oswald case and the Warren Report,46 
and the Sheppard case47 and the Reardon Report,48 contains inter-
esting materials on the use of cameras in the courtroom. Again, 
the law student will benefit from the anecdotal material supplied 
by the journalism professor, Mr. Gillmor. Chapter IV also devotes 
a fascinating section to the liability of the American and English 
press for "contempt of court" for statements about the parties or 
the judge in a pending trial. Not many Americans know, for exam-
ple, that if an English court concludes that a newspaper story has 
had a "reasonable tendency" of "polluting the streams of justice,"49 
it can hold the publisher, the editor, the reporters, or the printers 
in contempt of court and commit them to prison. In 1949, for 
instance, the editor of the London Daily Mirror was sentenced to 
43. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957). 
44. For the Federal Communications Commission's recently enunciated views on 
"indecent language" over the airwaves, see Eastern Educ. Radio (WUHY-Fl\l), 18 
P 8: F RADIO R.Ec. 2d 860 (1970) (FCC 70-346, released April 3, 1970), (Commissioners Cox 
and Johnson dissenting). 
45. 366 U.S. 717 (1961). In Irvin, the Court vacated a murder conviction on the 
ground that the defendant did not have a fair trial by a panel of impartial jurors. 
The Court found that the effect of widespread newspaper publicity was to create a 
" 'pattern of deep and bitter prejudice' shown to be present throughout the com-
munity," 366 U.S. at 727, a pattern which was reflected in the voir dire examinations 
of the jurors who were finally placed in the jury box. 
46. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE AsSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN 
F. KENNEDY (1964). 
47. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). 
48. The Reardon Report, prepared by the American Bar Association's Advisory 
Committee on Fair Trial and Free Press [Proposed Final Draft approved Feb. 19, 1968; 
earlier version published under the title Fair Trial and Free Press (1966)], suggested 
the use of the courts' contempt power against persons who had disseminated extra-
judicial statements deliberately designed to affect the outcome of a trial during its 
pendency. It is strongly criticized by Professor Gillmor (Pp. 372-78). 
49. Barron 8: Gillmor (p. 420) (emphasis supplied). 
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three months in prison and fined approximately 28,000 dollars when 
the Mirror headlined the arrest of a murder suspect, "The Vampire 
Man Held," in a rather obvious reference to the rumor that the 
suspect drank the blood of his victims through a straw.50 Similarly, 
when Newsweek magazine hinted that a relationship might exist 
between an English doctor accused of administering overdoses of 
sleeping pills and the legacies left him by his deceased patients, 
Newsweek's chief European correspondent barely escaped a con-
tempt citation from an English court, even though he had absolutely 
no connection with the story. These materials on English law demon-
strate the comparative freedom which the American press has for 
comment on pending trials, and they thus place that freedom into 
striking perspective. 
Chapter V samples a number of lesser-known, but nevertheless 
important, problems of law and journalism. Included are treatments 
of access to- the records of governmental agencies (a subject in 
which Ralph Nader is rapidly becoming expert), the freedom of 
newsmen to travel to collect information, the rights of individuals 
to resist the glare of publicity, and the problems of lobbying and 
anonymous speech. Most important, however, the authors consider 
a subject that is often overlooked in comparable studies-the inter-
relation of the antitrust laws and the freedoms of speech and press. 
In early cases on this subject, the press had argued successfully that 
the first amendment effectively exempted them from the sanctions 
of the antitrust laws.51 The courts, however, have stood this notion 
on its head-intimating in a number of cases that the first amend-
ment may actually compel the equivalent of antitrust treatment 
for the communications media. 52 As the authors suggest, the "market 
place of ideas" is a sterile concept when all the newspapers and all 
the radio and television stations in one community or state are 
owned by the same person, entity, or corporation. 
Finally, chapter VI acquaints the student with certain legal 
and policy questions involved in radio and television broadcasting. 
After discussing the rationale for the FCC's regulatory control 
over broadcasting, the authors take the reader through an analysis 
of the Commission's "balanced programming" concepts, the fairness 
and equal-time doctrines, policies of the diversification of owner-
ship rules, and problems both of new technologies-cable television, 
pay-TV, and communications satellites-and of their impact on the 
future of mass communications. 
A reading of Gillmor and Barron's excellent 853-page treatment 
50. The rumor, by the suspect's own admission, was subsequently confirmed as true. 
51. E.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); Associated Press v. 
NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937). 
52. See, e.g., Hale v. FCC, No. 22, 751 (D.C. Cir., Feb. 16, 1970), at 1, 7, 8·10 (slip 
opinion) CTudge Tamm, concurring and citing further authority). 
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of the law of mass communications may strike the reader with 
an important but somewhat hidden aspect of constitutional law: 
whereas literally hundreds of cases involving the limits of permis-
sible-speech content have reached the federal circuit courts and 
the Supreme Court-in areas of obscenity, group association, sub-
versive activity, and so forth-not one case, to my knowledge, has 
reached these courts in the past three decades concerning permissible-
speech content in the broadcasting media. This absence seems odd, 
since booksellers, magazine publishers, and film distributors-start-
ing with the famous test cases over Ulysses53 and Lady Chatterley's 
Lover54-have repeatedly gone to court to defend the people's 
freedom to disseminate and receive ideas, concepts, and varying 
forms of artistic expression. What accounts for the absence of the 
broadcasters in this fight to defend first amendment freedoms? 
The answer, I think, is twofold. First, broadcasters have stayed 
so far away from the "experimental," the "innovative," or the "con-
troversial" that they have never had to test the limits of free speech 
in this country. Whatever else Green Acres, The Beverly Hillbillies, 
or other mass-appeal programs may be, they scarcely appeal to one's 
"prurient interests" or create a "clear and present danger" of foment-
ing ideas heretical to entrenched notions of national security in 
this country. Second, even when broadcasters have occasionally, and 
perhaps accidentally, strayed too close to the line separating medi-
ocrity from creativity, they seem to have generally refused to seek 
judicial protection for their first amendment rights.55 When in such 
cases the Government has subpoenaed information from the broad-
casters or has imposed fines or other forms of punishment on them 
for allegedly "subversive" programming, and when the broadcasters 
have then been faced with the option of fighting in court or sub-
mitting to the Government, they have too often opted for submission. 
The same willingness to comply with the Government at any cost 
can be seen in the newspaper industry. For example, one com-
mentator reported that a New York Times newsman "suggested to 
an editor at the Times that his being subpoenaed to appear at the 
Spock trial was a violation of the First Amendment guarantees of 
53. United States v. One Book Entitled "Ulysses", 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), 
affd., 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934). 
54. Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry, 175 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), afjd., 276 
F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1960). 
55. The latest example of such acquiescence involved WUHY-FM. See note 44 
supra. The FCC (Commissioners Cox and Johnson dissenting) fined WUHY-FM $100 
for broadcasting allegedly "indecent" language. In so doing, the FCC created new justi-
fications for bans on minority forms of speech over the broadcast media, hoping that 
the licensee would take this important test case to the courts. Rather than fight, how-
ever, WUHY-FM decided to pay the $100 fine and the proceedings were terminated. 
Apparently no appeal will be brought, and this dangerous Commission precedent will 
remain on the books. 
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press freedom . . . . But he says he was told not to make an issue 
of it and to answer."56 
Gillmor and Barron's book will not supply intestinal fortitude 
to industries known more for their acquiescence than their courage 
in fighting for freedoms of speech. But it may encourage broadcasters 
and journalists to push their skills to the limits of the first amend-
ment, and it may give lawyers for the corporate media the com-
mitment to support the broadcasters and journalists when they clo. 
Nicholas Johnson, 
Com missioner, 
Federal Communications Commission 
56. SATURDAY R.EvlEW, March 14, 1970, at 106. 
